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27 March 1951

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

FROM: Assistant Director, Office of National Estimates

SUBJECT: Reply to Request [REDACTED]

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1. The following are ONE's views on the four questions [REDACTED]

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2. What are the main factors governing Chinese military actions in Korea at the present juncture?

At the present juncture, Chinese Communist forces appear to be evading major contacts with UN forces and making a planned withdrawal north of the 38th Parallel while fresh North Korean and Chinese units are being moved south from Manchuria. The main factors governing Chinese Communist action at this juncture probably have been heavy losses in manpower, logistic difficulties, and lack of artillery and air support.

3. (a) What is the present supply situation of Chinese and North Korean forces? (b) Do you consider air action will prevent them concentrating large forces in the neighborhood of the 38th Parallel sufficient to resume the offensive?

a. We do not believe there are any significant reserves of equipment or supplies in North Korea except for what may be in the supply pipelines. There are indications that front line units, in both Chinese Communist and North Korean armies, are critically short of gasoline and often lack adequate supplies of weapons, ammunition.

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food, and medical supplies. Fairly sizable reserve stocks exist in Manchuria, but gasoline and transport shortages plus UN aerial interdiction have interfered with their delivery to Communist forces in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel.

b. UN air action alone cannot prevent the eventual build-up of Communist forces north of the 38th Parallel sufficient to resume the offensive. Although strong UN ground action and UN aerial interdiction of lines of communication appear to have upset any Communist offensive plans for the immediate future, the Communists continue to have the potential for offensive action. They are currently in the process of regroupment and large reserves are moving south into the area between the 39th and 38th parallels. Unless UN ground forces are able to continue exerting strong pressure to keep them off balance, Communist forces probably can build up sufficient strength and stockpile sufficient supplies to support renewed offensive efforts by early May.

3. Must the Chinese depend on Russia for further supplies of military equipment or can the Chinese supply this from their own resources by drawing on existing divisions?

So far as is known, Soviet support to Chinese Communist forces in Korea has been limited to fuel, some small arms and certain minor items of equipment. The Chinese Communists, from their own resources, probably could continue for a considerable time to supply their troops with the types of weapons and equipment now being employed. The Chinese Communists can obtain tanks, artillery, and additional aircraft only from the USSR.

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4. Do you consider that so long as the Chinese have Korea on their hands they will not attempt action elsewhere?

Chinese losses in the Korean campaign have not yet critically affected Peiping's capabilities to attempt military actions elsewhere. We believe, however, that the problems that the Chinese Communists are facing as the result of their commitment in Korea and the psychological impact of the strong UN resistance there may prove significant factors in deterring China from actions elsewhere. On the other hand, if the USSR and Communist China felt that the outbreak of general hostilities was imminent, the Communist position in Korea would not be decisive in deterring Chinese Communist action in other Far Eastern areas.

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